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Burch: Burch: Attempting to Set Aside

ATTEMPTING TO SET ASIDE DEED

OF SALE FORECLOSURE BECAUSE
OF TRUSTEE'S FIDUCIARY BREACH:
MORTGAGOR IN POSITION OF
OUTSIDER LOOKING IN
Boatmen's Bank v. Community Interiors,Inc.'
Losing one's property through a foreclosure sale is a traumatic experience. It is even worse if the sale does not bring enough to cover the debts
owing against the property. Being sued for a deficiency judgment in addition
to losing one's property adds proverbial insult to injury. One way for the mortgagor to fight back is to try to have the foreclosure sale set aside by alleging
that the sale was conducted in an unfair manner. This was the scenario behind
Boatmen's Bank v. Community Interiors,Inc., decided by the Missouri Court
of Appeals for the Eastern District.
Boatmen's Bank (Boatmen's), holder of the second deed of trust, brought
an action against the mortgagor, Community Interiors, Inc. (Community), a
corporation wholly owned by Ron and Karen Eisenbeis,2 for a deficiency which
resulted from the foreclosure of the first deed of trust held by Ozark Federal
Savings and Loan Association (Ozark).3 Community counterclaimed against
Boatmen's and brought in as third-party defendants Ozark, Douglas Draper
(the trustee), Mason Investments, Inc. (Draper's corporation), Douglas Land
Ltd. (Draper's corporation), Forrest Crump (the purchaser at the sale),
Krazo, Inc. (Crump's corporation), and United Missouri Bank.' Community
sought to set aside the sale and recover compensatory and punitive damages. 5
The trial court held in favor of Boatmen's on the deficiency claim and
dismissed Community's counterclaims. 6 Community appealed the decision, alleging that the foreclosure sale should be set aside because Draper had
breached his fiduciary duties as trustee and because Draper and Crump, the
1. 721 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
2. Id. at 74. Also named as defendants were Community's owners, Ron and
Karen Eisenbeis, and Paul Harter, all of whom personally guaranteed the Boatmen's
Bank note. Id. The claims against the guarantors will not be analyzed in this Article.
The trial court held against Ron and Karen Eisenbeis on their guaranties of the loan
but held for Harter on his guaranty. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's ruling on the liability of the Eisenbeis's but reversed on the issue of Harter's liability. Id.
For the court's reasoning on the claim against Harter, see id. at 78-80.
3. Id. at 75.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 74.
6. Id.
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purchaser at the sale, had acted in concert in chilling the bidding at the sale.7
The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.8
A foreclosure sale in Missouri may be conducted by one of two methods-by judicial foreclosure or by power of sale foreclosure.10 In both types of
foreclosure, the same purposes are achieved. 1" All interests that are junior to
the mortgage being foreclosed are terminated, and the purchaser at the foreclosure sale obtains the same title that the mortgagor had at the time the
2
foreclosed mortgage was executed .
The power of sale method is used more often than the judicial method
because it saves time and money. 13 Two types of security devices with power
of sale are used in Missouri real estate transactions. 4 The most common
method is the deed of trust with power of sale in the trustee.' 5 The less frequently used method is a mortgage giving the mortgagee the power of sale.' 6
Although there are advantages in using the power of sale foreclosure,
there is one major disadvantage to its use. Titles obtained by purchasers in a
power of sale foreclosure are less stable than those obtained in a judicial
sale.'7 Reasons that have been cited for this proposition center primarily
around the fact that since the court has not supervised the foreclosure sale
through an adversarial proceeding, there is a greater chance of something be8
ing amiss.'
Therein lies the problem. Since there is no court supervision of the foreclosure sale, temptation may exist to conduct the sale in a manner favoring
one of the parties. It may be especially tempting for the mortgagee to influ7. Id. at 76.
8. Id. at 74.
9. See Mo. REV.

STAT. § 443.190 (1986).
10. See id. §§ 443.290, 443.410.
11. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL

ESTATE FINANCE LAW §

7.19, at 536

(2d ed. 1985).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Dingus, Mortgages - Redemption After ForeclosureSale in Missouri,
25 Mo. L. REV. 261, 261 (1960).
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.19, at 537.

18. Real estate scholars Grant Nelson and Dale Whitman suggest the following

reasons for the greater stability of title arising from judicial foreclosure:
First, the court supervision involved in judicial foreclosure will prevent many
defects from arising. Second, because judicial foreclosure is an adversary proceeding, the presence of other parties who will bring possible defects to the
court's attention constitutes added protection against a faulty end product.
Finally, the concept of judicial finality provides substantial insulation against
subsequent collateral attack even on technically defective judicial foreclosure
proceedings. None of these protections are inherent in power of sale
foreclosure.
G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.19, at 537.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/11
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ence the sale since the person authorized to conduct the sale, the trustee, is
generally chosen by the mortgagee.19 Thus it has been said that courts will
held without court order" and will watch
scrutinize foreclosure proceedings
21
them with jealous solicitude.
To help alleviate problems in the power of sale foreclosure, safeguards are
built into the system. One of these safeguards is the holding of the trustee to
the status of a fiduciary. It has been consistently held by the courts that the
trustee is a fiduciary to both the mortgagee and the mortgagor, 2 and as such,
must exercise the utmost good faith 23 and impartiality 24 in performing his du26
ties. As agent of both parties,25 he has an equal duty of fairness to both.
"Neither the law nor the parties intend that the trustee shall be a nose of wax,
19.

See S.

TODD, MISSOURi FORECLOSURES OF DEEDS OF TRUSTS

§ 2-3 (1983).

20. See, e.g., Farris v. Hendrichs, 413 S.W.2d 185, 189 (Mo. 1967); West v.
Axtell, 322 Mo. 401, 414, 17 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1929); Stine v. Wilkson, 10 Mo. 54, 65
(1846).

21. See Stoffel v. Schroeder, 62 Mo. 147, 149 (1876).
22. See, e.g., Spires v. Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); Edwards v. Smith, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1959); Smith v. Haley, 314 S.W.2d 909,
913 (Mo. 1958); see also Collins v. Gaskill, 359 Mo. 171, 221 S.W.2d 181 (1949);
Fried v. Marburger, 353 Mo. 1146, 186 S.W.2d 584 (1945); Vannoy v. Duvall Trust
Co., 29 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1930); West v. Axtell, 322 Mo. 401, 17 S.W.2d 328 (1929);
In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. 71, 112 S.W.2d 594 (1937).
23. See, e.g., Stone v. Stone, 176 S.W.2d 464, 467 (Mo. 1944); Hurst Automatic
Switch & Signal Co. v. Trust Co., 216 S.W. 954, 958 (Mo. 1919); see also Long v.
Long, 79 Mo. 644 (1883); Chesley v. Chesley, 49 Mo. 540 (1872).
24. See, e.g., Spires v. Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); Edwards v. Smith, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1959); see Ewing v. McIntosh, 359 Mo.
625, 222 S.W.2d 738 (1949); Wooldridge v. Dittmeier, 190 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. 1945);
Fried v. Marburger, 353 Mo. 1146, 186 S.W.2d 584 (1945); West v. Axtell, 322 Mo.
401, 17 S.W.2d 328 (1929); Hurst Automatic Switch & Signal Co. v. Trust Co., 216
S.W. 954 (Mo. 1919); Hanson v. Neal, 215 Mo. 256, 114 S.W. 1073 (1908); Charles
Green Real Estate Co. v. St. Louis Mut. House Bldg. Co., 196 Mo. 358, 93 S.W. I1111
(1906); Long v. Long, 79 Mo. 644 (1883); Goode v. Comfort, 39 Mo. 313 (1866);
Stine v. Wilkson, 10 Mo. 54 (1846); In re Lacy, 234 Mo. App. 71, 112 S.W.2d 594
(1937).
25. See Edwards v. Smith, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1959); see also Ewing v.
McIntosh, 359 Mo. 625, 222 S.W.2d 738 (1949); Stone v. Hammons, 347 Mo. 129,
146 S.W.2d 606 (1940); Vannoy v. Duvall Trust Co., 29 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1930);
West v. Axtell, 322 Mo. 401, 17 S.W.2d 328 (1929); Krug v. Bremer, 316 Mo. 891,
292 S.W. 702 (1927); Hanson v. Neal, 215 Mo. 256, 114 S.W. 1073 (1908); Charles
Green Real Estate Co. v. St. Louis Mut. House Bldg. Co., 196 Mo. 358, 93 S.W. I1111
(1906); Goode v. Comfort, 39 Mo. 313 (1866).
26. See, e.g., Spires v. Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372, 378 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); Edwards v. Smith, 322 S.W.2d 770, 777 (Mo. 1979); see Ewing v. McIntosh, 359 Mo.
625, 222 S.W.2d 738 (1949); Wooldridge v. Dittmeier, 190 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. 1945);
Fried v. Marburger, 353 Mo. 1146, 186 S.W.2d 584 (1945); Stone v. Hammons, 347
Mo. 129, 146 S.W.2d 606 (1940); Vannoy v. Duvall Trust Co., 29 S.W.2d 692 (Mo.
1930); West v. Axtell, 322 Mo. 401, 17 S.W.2d 328 (1929); Krug v. Bremer, 316 Mo.
891, 292 S.W. 702 (1927); Vail v. Jacobs, 62 Mo. 130 (1876); Goode v. Comfort, 39
Mo. 313 (1866); Stine v. Wilkson, 10 Mo. 54 (1846).
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a mere figure-head, in the hands of the creditor or of the auctioneer. He is
placed in a position to act fairly by all interested ...."7
The trustee is "entrusted with the important function of transferring one
man's property to another, and therefore both reason and justice will exact of
[him] the most scrupulous fidelity. ' '28 The mortgagor has the right to expect
the sale to be honestly conducted so that the sale will yield the best possible
price to be applied to the note securing the deed of trust.2 9 If the trustee acts
unfairly, and there is injury because of this conduct, the trustee has breached
his fiduciary duties even if his conduct is unintentional.3 0
The other safeguard built into the system is that if the trustee has failed
to conduct the sale in accordance with his fiduciary duties, the mortgagor may
appeal to the court of equity to have the sale set aside. 31 Where it can be
shown that the trustee through fraud, 32 unfair dealing,33 or mistake 34 has inhibited the sale proceeding, the court will set aside the sale. "Upon very slight
proof of fraud, or unfair conduct, or any departure from the terms of the
power, [the sale] will be set aside."'35 Even if there is not substantial evidence
of actual fraud on the part of the trustee, an unfair sale will be set aside and
27. Vail v. Jacobs, 62 Mo. 130, 133 (1876).
28. Goode v. Comfort, 39 Mo. 313, 325 (1866).
29. Dwyer v. Rohan, 99 Mo. App. 120, 129, 73 S.W. 384, 387 (1903); see Chesley v. Chesley, 49 Mo. 540, 542 (1872).
30. See Krug v. Bremer, 316 Mo. 891, 900, 292 S.W. 702, 705 (1927).
31. See, e.g., Spires v. Edgar, 513 S.W.2d 372 (Mo. 1974) (en banc); Farris v.
Hendrichs, 413 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. 1967); Edwards v. Smith, 322 S.W.2d 770 (Mo.
1959); Jackson v. Klein, 320 S.W.2d 553 (Mo. 1959); Loeb v. Dowling, 349 Mo. 674,
162 S.W.2d 875 (1942); Peterson v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 Mo. 770, 98
S.W.2d 700 (1936); Stine v. Wilkson, 10 Mo. 54 (1846); Gempp v. Teiber, 173 S.W.2d
651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943).
A void sale means there has been no sale and legal title has never passed to the
purchaser. S. TODD, supra note 19, § 4-14. It may be set aside by the mortgagor at any
time. Id. Most defects, however, render the sale merely voidable. Id. The purchaser in
a voidable sale receives only legal title with the rights of redemption remaining in the
mortgagor or his assignee. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.20, at 538.
If there has not been a bona fide purchaser in a voidable sale, the court may set aside
the sale. S. TODD, supra note 19, § 4-17. However, if there has been a bona fide purchaser, the mortgagor's remedy is merely damages for the defective foreclosure. Id. §
2-7. This Note will be concerned exclusively with voidable sales where there have not
been bona fide purchasers, Le., those sales which may be set aside by the courts.
32. See, e.g., Masonic Home of Missouri v. Windsor, 338 Mo. 877, 92 S.W.2d
713 (1936); Hewitt v. Price, 204 Mo. 31, 102 S.W. 647 (1907); Whelan v. Reilly, 61
Mo. 565 (1876); Clarkson v. Creely, 35 Mo. 95 (1864).
33. See, e.g., Smith v. Haley, 314 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. 1958); Ewing v. McIntosh,
359 Mo. 625, 222 S.W.2d 738 (1949); Stone v. Hammons, 347 Mo. 129, 146 S.W.2d
606 (1940); Vannoy v. Duvall Trust Co., 29 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. 1939); Whelan v. Reilly,
61 Mo. 565 (1876); Goode v. Comfort, 39 Mo. 313 (1866); Clarkson v. Creely, 35 Mo.

95 (1864).
34. See, e.g., West v. Axtell, 322 Mo. 401, 17 S.W.2d 328 (1929).
35. Polliham v. Reveley, 181 Mo. 622, 634, 81 S.W. 182, 185 (1904).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/11
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the deed of trust reinstated if one of the parties thereto has been injured.36 If
proceeding, there is
there have been several irregularities in the foreclosure
37
sale.
the
aside
set
will
court
the
that
likelihood
more
Courts of equity have always watched [the trustees'] proceedings with a jealous and scrutinizing eye; and where it is clearly shown that they have abused
their trust, or combined with one party to the detriment of the other, relief
will be granted. Not that a sale made by them will be set aside on slight and
frivolous grounds; but where it appears that substantial injury has resulted
from their action, where, in pursuance of their powers, they have failed or
neglected to exercise a wise and sound discretion, equity will interfere. It is
impossible in the very nature of things to lay down any precise rule applicable
alike to all cases which may arise, but every case must be decided on the
especial facts and circumstances which surround it and upon which it is
founded. 38
In Community's action to set aside the sale, it alleged that Draper had
breached his fiduciary duties in several respects. 39 He had bid for the second
mortgagee at the sale; he had acquired an interest in the outcome of the sale
by financing Crump's purchase at the sale; he had not sold the property for
cash; he had acquired an interest in the property after the sale; he had acted
in concert with the purchaser in chilling the bidding at the sale; and he had
sold the property for inadequate consideration. Since the facts and circumstances surrounding a foreclosure sale determine its validity, each of Community's allegations will be analyzed separately by applying the facts of Boatmen's to the applicable law.
Community alleged that because Draper had bid on behalf of the second
mortgagee at the foreclosure sale, he had breached his fiduciary duties. 40 On
the day of the sale, an employee from Boatmen's Bank, holder of the second
deed of trust on the property, telephoned Draper's wholly-owned Hillsboro Title Company to request that someone from that office place a bid at the sale
on behalf of Boatmen's. 41 A bid for Boatmen's was thereafter entered at the
sale. 42 There was no testimony at the trial regarding who actually entered the
bid for Boatmen's, but Draper was the only representative from his title company who was present at the sale.43 It is inferred that Draper actually did

place the bid for Boatmen's.
The court relied on two cases 44 in ruling that there was nothing wrong
with a trustee announcing bids of prospective purchasers who are not present
36.
37.
38.
39.

See West v. Axtell, 322 Mo. 401, 17 S.W.2d 328 (1929).
See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 539.
Goode v. Comfort, 39 Mo. 313, 325 (1866).
Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 76.

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id.
Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
See Springfield Engine & Thresher Co. v. Donovan, 147 Mo. 622, 49 S.W.

500 (1899); Allied Mortgage & Dev. Co. v. Pitts, 272 N.C. 196, 158 S.E.2d 53 (1967).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
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at the sale.45 The only Missouri case that addresses this issue held that a beneficiary in a trust deed may ask the trustee through letter to enter a bid for him
at the foreclosure sale.48 In the other case cited by the court, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that as long as the trustee was not acting as the note
holder's agent, he could place a bid for the note holder at the sale. 47 There was
no evidence that Draper was acting as an agent for Boatmen's Bank. His responsibility was to merely announce the bid that Boatmen's employee had
asked his title company to enter. The court found nothing wrong with this
procedure and dismissed Community's claim in this regard. 48
A more convincing allegation of fiduciary misconduct was that Draper
had acquired an interest in the outcome of the sale by financing the purchase
of the property. 49 On the day of the sale, Crump telephoned Draper and requested that Draper give him a "short-term" loan so that he could purchase at
the foreclosure sale. 50 Draper agreed. After the foreclosure sale, Crump accompanied Draper to Draper's Hillsboro Title Company where the note was
executed in the name of Crump's corporation, Krazo, Inc., to Draper's corporation, Mason Investments, Inc.51
The court held that the trustee's financing of the purchaser's loan did not
constitute a breach of the trustee's fiduciary duties.5 2 Neither the court nor
Community cited any authority for their respective positions on this issue. Nor
did the court give any explanation as to why it ruled as it did.
Although there are no cases on point, it has been stated that the trustee
should avoid placing himself in such a position that his interests are in conflict
with the interests of the parties to whom he owes a fiduciary duty.63 "He cannot use the subject of the trust, or his relation to it, for his own personal
benefit, advantage, or gain."'"
In Krug v. Bremer,5 5 the trustee cried the sale three times in one day, the
first two times without giving the mortgagor/purchaser adequate time to obtain financing although the mortgagor had indicated that he could obtain it.
After the third crying of the sale, a different purchaser was not required to
45. Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 77.
46. Springfield Engine & Thresher Co., 147 Mo. 622, 49 S.W. 500.
47. Pitts,272 N.C. 196, 158 S.E.2d 53; see also Elks v. Interstate Trustee Corp.,
209 N.C. 832, 184 S.E. 826 (1936) (bid entered for mortgagee by corporate trustee's
attorney after receiving telephone call from mortgagee requesting such bid to be entered held valid).
48. Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 75.
49. Id. at 76.
50. Id. at 75.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 77.
53. See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 299, at 377 (1949); see also Holman v. Ryon, 56
F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1932).
54. 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 299, at 377 (1949); see also Hadley Bros.-Uhl Co. v.
Scott, 227 Mo. App. 354, 363, 53 S.W.2d 1070, 1074 (1932).
55. 316 Mo. 891, 292 S.W. 702 (1927).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/11
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give cash at that time. Instead, two days later the trustee negotiated a loan to
the purchaser to finance the sale. The court held that the sale had been conducted unfairly.
We infer that he had a secret understanding, either before or during the cryings of the sale, with [the purchaser] to furnish funds to finance a sale to

[him]. His undoubted interest was to obtain a commission for negotiating the
loan. This information he failed to disclose to [the mortgagor/purchaser].

While one may choose the persons to whom he lends money, yet, where the
lending of money to one party gives that party a material advantage over the
other party, the act will be held partiality."
The Boatmen's court did not discuss whether Draper's opportunity to hold
the note and to obtain interest payments therefrom made him partial to purchasers. Nor did the court discuss whether this situation would be to Draper's
benefit, advantage, or gain. Surely those were considerations that warranted a
closer analysis than that engaged in by the Boatmen's court.
Related to Draper's financing of Crump's purchase was the complaint
that Draper had not sold the property at the sale "for cash." 5 Draper had
announced prior to the sale that according to the terms of the deed of trust
and of the notice of the sale, the purchaser of the property would be required
to pay ten percent of the purchase price at the time of the sale and the remaining amount in cash at Draper's title company office within one hour of
the sale.5
The reason for a mortgage or deed of trust's requirement of a cash bid at
a foreclosure sale is to prevent the debtor from frustrating the sale by making
an unreliable bid.5 9 If a foreclosing mortgagee makes arrangements for a
method of payment other than what is typically thought of as cash, the mortgagor cannot complain.60 Thus, where the foreclosing mortgagee was willing to
finance a third party's bid by taking a new note and deed of trust, the sale met
6
the "for cash" requirement. '
It is within the discretion of the trustee to question whether a particular
bidder has the means available to purchase at the sale.62 He may require the
bidder to prove his ability to pay the amount as long as the bidder is not asked
to reveal to any other bidder his assets or intentions as to future bidding."
When Crump purchased at the sale, he did not pay any cash at that
56. Id. at 901-02, 292 S.W. at 706.
57. Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 76.
58. Id. at 75.
59. See Davis v. Hess, 103 Mo. 31, 37, 15 S.W. 324, 325 (1891); Roark v. Plaza
Say. Ass'n, 570 S.W.2d 825, 829 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
60. See S. TODD, MISSOURI FORECLOSURES OF DEEDS OF TRUSTS § 4-10 (Supp.
1986).
61. See Snyder v. Chicago, S.F. & C. Ry., 131 Mo. 568, 579, 33 S.W. 67, 70

(1895).
62. See Roark v. Plaza Say. Ass'n, 570 S.W.2d 825, 830 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
63. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
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time.64 Instead, Crump and Draper went to Draper's title company office
where Crump signed a note for the entire purchase price, followed by a Mason
Investments check being deposited into the title company's escrow account."
A trustee should substantially comply with a provision that the sale is to
be in cash. 6 However, it is not necessary that the terms be given a literal
meaning.6 7 Thus it has been held that where the purchaser was granted a few
hours" or a few days6" to pay the balance of the purchase money, the sale was
"for cash."
Crump executed the note, and the funds were transferred from the invest-0
ment company account to the title company account within one hour of sale.7
Therefore, there was a short time span between the sale and the time of payment. In addition, Draper knew that because of his agreement to finance
Crump's purchase, Crump had available to him any money needed to make
his bid good. Both the trial court and the appellate court agreed that the sale
had essentially been "for cash" and no fiduciary duty had been breached.71
The most serious allegation was that Draper, as trustee, acquired an interest in the property after the sale.72 Three or four days after the foreclosure
sale, Draper agreed to tear up the note Crump had executed to Draper's investment company in return for a one-half interest in the property purchased
by Crump at the foreclosure sale.73 Draper through his company, Douglas
Land Ltd., and Crump through his company, Krazo, Inc., borrowed money
from United Missouri Bank of Jefferson County to pay off Krazo's note owed
to Draper's Mason Investments, Inc.7" Both Draper and Crump personally
guaranteed the note given to United Missouri.7 5 After the loan was renewed
several times, Draper purchased the note and was holder of the note at the
time of trial.7 6 At all times after the foreclosure sale,"the property was titled in
Krazo's name, and Draper and Crump shared equally all income and expenses
77
of the property.
64. Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 75.
65.

Id.

71.

Id.

66. See Charles Green Real Estate Co. v. St. Louis Mut. House Bldg. Co., 196
Mo. 358, 370, 93 S.W. 1111, 1114 (1906).
67. See 59 C.J.S. Mortgages § 576, at 972 (1949).
68. See, e.g., Davis v. Hess, 103 Mo. 31, 15 S.W. 324 (1891) (thirty minutes).
69. See, e.g., Long v. Manning, 455 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. 1970) (six days); Charles
Green Real Estate Co. v. St. Louis Mut. House Bldg. Co., 196 Mo. 358, 93 S.W. I 11
(1906) (fifteen days); Snyder v. Chicago, S.F. & C. Ry., 131 Mo. 568, 33 S.W. 67
(1895) (approximately two months).
70. Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 77.
72. Id. at 76.
73. Id. at 75.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Missouri law clearly prohibits a trustee from purchasing the property
himself at his own foreclosure sale. 78 This doctrine appears to apply whether
the trustee purchases directly or whether he purchases indirectly through a
straw party.79 The reason for not allowing the trustee to purchase "stands
upon our great moral obligation, to refrain from placing ourselves in relations
which ordinarily excite a conflict between self-interest and integrity." 80 There2
fore, even if the sale has been made in good faith,81 or results in no injury," it
may still be set aside.
The disability is intended to lift the trustee above temptation; to induce
him-to compel him, rather-as far as possible, instead of planning sales to
benefit himself, instead of to that end arranging them either as to time or the
circumstances surrounding them, instead of studying to conceal material
facts, to look only to the interests of the person for whom he acts. 83
Actual fraud need not be shown when the trustee purchases at his own

84

sale.
This rule is adhered to, not because there is, but because there may be, fraud.
It is the duty of the trustee in making a sale to obtain the high dollar. It is the
duty of a person representing a purchaser to acquire the land at as reasonable
a price as possible. When the same person is both the seller and the buyer,
there is a conflicting, antagonistic interest and duty which the law condemns.
This practice ... opens the door for fraud and oppression. At all times the
trustee selling under the power of sale . . . should be and remain at arm's

length to the buyer.85

78. See, e.g., Starr v. Mitchell, 361 Mo. 908, 237 S.W.2d 123 (1951); Wooldridge v. Dittmeier, 190 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. 1945); Pueblo Real Estate, Loan & Inv. Co.
v. Johnson, 342 Mo. 991, 119 S.W.2d 274 (1938); Northcutt v. Fine, 44 S.W.2d 125
(Mo. 1931); Miles v. Popp, 192 S.W. 424 (Mo. 1917); Duncan v. Home Coop. Co.,
221 Mo. 315, 120 S.W. 733 (1909); Lass v. Sternberg, 50 Mo. 124 (1872); Thornton v.
Irwin, 43 Mo. 153 (1869); Dwyer v. Rohan, 99 Mo. App. 120, 73 S.W. 384 (1903).
79. See, e.g., Loeb v. Dowling, 349 Mo. 674, 162 S.W.2d 875 (1942); Giraldin v.
Howard, 103 Mo. 40, 15 S.W. 383 (1891); Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153 (1869);
Gempp v. Teiber, 173 S.W.2d 651 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943); see also Dingus, supra note
14, at 281.
80. Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153, 164 (1869) (quoting Michaud v. Girod, 45
U.S. (4 How.) 188 (1845)).
81. See, e.g., Wooldridge v. Dittmeier, 190 S.W.2d 926 (Mo. 1945); Loeb v.
Dowling, 349 Mo. 674, 162 S.W.2d 875 (1942); Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153 (1869).
82. See, e.g., Loeb v. Dowling, 349 Mo.674, 162 S.W.2d 875 (1942).
83. Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153, 165 (1869).
84. See, e.g., Wooldridge v. Dittmeier, 190 S.W.2d 926, 930 (Mo. 1945).
85. Davis v. Doggett, 212 N.C. 589, 593, 194 S.E. 288, 290 (1937). The Missouri Supreme Court, in Thornton v. Irwin, similarly stated:
However innocent the purchase may be in the given case, it is poisonous in its
consequence. The cestui que trust is not bound to prove, nor is the court
bound to judge, that the trustee has made a bargain advantageous to himself.
The fact may be so, and yet the party not have it in his power distinctly and
clearly to show it. There may be fraud ...

and the party not able to prove it.

It is to guard against this uncertainty and hazard of abuse, and to remove the
trustee from temptation, that the rule does and will permit the cestui que
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
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Such a purchase by the trustee renders the sale voidable.80 However, the
debtor may consent to the trustee's purchase prior to the sale or ratify the sale
as long as the debtor has full knowledge of all the facts.87 If the debtor has not
consented either before or after the purchase by the trustee, "a trustee
purchasing at his own sale, directly or indirectly, takes the property subject to
redemption by the grantor in the deed of trust. The trust is not advanced." 88
One case upon which Community relied was Miles v. Popp,89 in which
the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that the trustee
had acquired a one-half interest in the property at the foreclosure sale. The
trustee and the second mortgagee in Miles had an insurance, real estate, and
investment partnership.90 They testified at trial that by the time of the foreclosure sale, they had dissolved the real estate and investment portions of their
partnership. 91 The second mortgagee purchased at the sale. 92 The court held
that the trustee was a secret purchaser at the sale of a one-half interest in the
land." Therefore, he had breached his fiduciary duties and the sale was set
94
aside.
Testimony of Draper and Crump in Boatmen's indicated that Crump,
through Krazo, Inc., had often borrowed money from Draper's Mason Investments to finance real estate purchases. 5 The real estate acquired was titled in
Krazo's name, with profits and losses shared equally by Draper and Crump. 8
In the past ten-year period they had been partners in such real estate ventures
approximately twenty-five times.9 7 Often Draper and Crump personally guaranteed the financing. 98
This information regarding Draper and Crump's past business dealings
was significant to Community because it was trying to imply that the Boattrust to come, at his own option and without showing actual injury, and insist
upon having the experiment of another sale.
Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153, 163 (1869).
86. See, e.g., Loeb v. Dowling, 349 Mo. 674, 162 S.W.2d 875 (1942); Giraldin v.
Howard, 103 Mo. 40, 15 S.W. 383 (1891); Landrum v. Union Bank, 63 Mo. 48
(1876). But cf.Northcutt v. Fine, 44 S.W.2d 125 (Mo. 1931) (sale was void); Stark v.
Love, 128 Mo. App. 24, 106 S.W. 87 (1907) (sale was void).
87. See Holman v. Ryon, 56 F.2d 307, 310 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Jackson v. Klein,
320 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Mo. 1959); Stark v. Love, 128 Mo. App. 24, 106 S.W. 87
(1907); Dwyer v. Rohan, 99 Mo. App. 120, 73 S.W. 384 (1903).
88. Jodd v. Lee, 256 Mo. 536, 540, 165 S.W. 991, 992 (1914).
89. 192 S.W. 424 (Mo. 1917).
90. Id. at 424.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 425.
93. Id. at 426.
94. Id.
95. Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 76.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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men's situation was a repeat of what the two partners had done in the past.9
If this were true, Draper would have in effect purchased a one-half interest
from himself, as did the trustee in Miles. However, the Boatmen's court made
light of this evidence. It distinguished Miles from the situation in Boatmen's
because the trial court in Miles had found that the trustee was a secret purchaser of a one-half interest in the land at the time of sale. 100 This was in
contrast to the trial court's finding in Boatmen's that Draper had not agreed to
take a one-half interest in the property until four days after the sale.' 0'
The distinguishing of the two cases seems to be more conclusory than
explanatory. What the court apparently did not consider was how difficult it
would be for a mortgagor to prove an agreement made between the trustee
and purchaser prior to the foreclosure sale. Generally, all information regarding any agreement they might have had would be in the hands of the trustee
and the purchaser. Unless there were a written agreement produced or either
of them testified to such an agreement, proving the agreement would be next
to impossible. The mortgagor would have to resort to implication by showing
what the parties had done in the past. Showing past conduct of the parties in
situations similar to the one at bar would be the only practical way in most
cases for the mortgagor to show what was probably intended by the parties
under the present circumstances.
The situation in Boatmen's was very similar to what Draper and Crump
had done many times previously. Draper had often financed real estate
purchases by Crump. They had purchased land together as partners twentyfive times in the past ten years, sharing profits and losses equally. The title to
the land was always in Krazo, Inc. They often personally guaranteed the notes
they used to finance the acquisitions. Surely it can be argued that this evidence should carry as much or more weight than any denials by Crump and
Draper to the agreement. Taking into consideration the experience and expertise Draper and Crump had in the real estate business, it cannot be expected
that any agreement for Draper to obtain an interest in the property would be
blatantly exposed for all to see. In fact, due to the past relationship of the
parties, an implied agreement could be inferred. If this were a contract action
where there was no express contract, a contract could be implied by determining the intent of the parties through the words and actions of the parties and
the surrounding circumstances. 0 2 The agreement could be shown through "the
ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men ....,03
Another way of attacking Draper's having obtained an interest in the
property is that even if there was no agreement prior to the sale, Draper still
should not have purchased an interest in the foreclosure sale property after the
99. Id.
100. Id. at 77.
101. Id.
102. See Follman Properties Co. v. Henty Constr. Co., 664 S.W.2d 248 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Muegler v. Crosthwait, 179 S.W.2d 761 (Mo. Ct. App. 1944).
103. Follman, 664 S.W.2d at 250.
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sale. The law in Missouri is that the trustee may purchase the property subsequent to the foreclosure sale if there has been no evidence of an unfair foreclosure.12 4 However, courts view a repurchase by the trustee "with a suspicious
eye and will jealously scrutinize the transaction."10 5 Whether the courts will
hold that the repurchase by the trustee renders the foreclosure sale voidable
depends upon the circumstances of the case. 1°0
In Jodd v. Lee,1 0 7 the court upheld a repurchase of the foreclosure property by the trustee four years after the foreclosure sale. The court determined
that there was no evidence that the foreclosure sale had been unfair, and thus
no reason why the trustee should be forever barred from owning the
08
property.2
However, in Smith v. Haley,1 0' a repurchase by the trustee thirty minutes
after the foreclosure sale was held to warrant setting aside the sale. The Missouri Supreme Court in Smith stated that the purchase thirty minutes after
the sale "exact[ed] greater fidelity on [the trustee's] part as a fiduciary than a
transaction involving strangers alone whenever this harsh method of depriving
a debtor of his property is to be upheld. 1 1 0 Other evidence of unfairness in the
sale, the Smith court reasoned,"' was such that it "stamped the trustee's repurchase as accomplishing by indirection ('as the fox runs') what the law prohibits him from doing directly ('as the bee flies') without the consent of the
debtor." '
The Boatmen's court distinguished Smith from the case at bar. The court
said that the Smith court had found other irregularities in the foreclosure sale
which rendered the sale unfair.1 1 3 The trial court in Boatmen's, however, had
found that Draper had not used his fiduciary powers to facilitate his acquisition of an interest in the property and had not breached his fiduciary duties. 1 4
Therefore, the court reasoned, the repurchase by him was valid.110
Related to the assumption that Draper and Crump had planned prior to
the sale to be partners in the ownership of the foreclosure property was the
allegation that Crump and Draper had conspired and, in effect, chilled the
bidding at the foreclosure sale.116 The allegation stems from a statement
Crump made to Ron Eisenbeis on the morning of the foreclosure sale. Crump
104.
Mo. 165,
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Smith v. Haley, 314 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. 1958); Mueller v. Becker, 263
172 S.W. 322 (1914); Jodd v. Lee, 256 Mo. 536, 165 S.W. 991 (1914).
Haley, 314 S.W.2d at 914.
See Thornton v. Irwin, 43 Mo. 153, 165 (1869).
256 Mo. 536, 165 S.W. 991 (1914).
Id. at 540, 165 S.W. at 992.
314 S.W.2d 909 (Mo. 1958).
Id. at 914.
See id. at 913-14.
Id. at 914.
Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 77.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 76.
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had gone to Community Interiors to inspect the property and informed
Eisenbeis that he intended to bid at the sale.117 Crump asked how much
money was owed on the property and Eisenbeis said he owed about
$142,000.18 Crump then made the statement that there "should be no problem bidding that much to cover that amount with some left over.' " 9 Eisenebis
told Crump that he would not bid at the sale. 2
Later that day, Paul Harter, a friend of Ron Eisenbeis, offered to help
Eisenbeis obtain financing to enable him to bid at the sale. 2' Eisenbeis refused
the assistance because he said Crump was going to bid enough to cover the
debt.1 22 Harter told Eisenbeis that he did not believe that Crump would pay
any more than was necessary to purchase at the sale.12 3 Three bids were entered at the sale: $76,000 by Ozark, the first mortgagee; $93,000 by Boatmen's; and $93,050 by Crump. 24 Crump's bid, therefore, was almost $50,000
less than the amount he had indicated to Eisenbeis.
The trial court held that Eisenbeis should have known that Crump would
not bid any more than was necessary and pointed out that Harter had known
not to rely on Crump's statement.1 25 The appellate court quoted the trial
court's reasoning:
A reasonable person would not believe that anyone would bid more than
was necessary to be the highest and last bidder at a foreclosure sale, and a
reasonable person would not rely on a representation that a person would bid
more than was necessary to be the highest and last bidder at a foreclosure
128
sale.
The court did not cite any authority in its analysis of the chilled bidding
allegation.
"Chilling a sale, generally speaking, is any combination or conspiracy
among bidders or others to suppress fair competition at such sale for the purpose of acquiring the property at less than its fair value."1 7 Chilled bidding is
of two types.'2 8 One type concerns an abuse of discretion by the trustee or
mortgagee which results in suppressed bidding.1 29 The second type of chilled
bidding involves either efforts by the mortgagee or trustee to suppress bidding,
or collusion between the mortgagee or trustee with the purchaser to suppress
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 75.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Vette v. Hackman, 292 Mo. 138, 148, 237 S.W. 802, 805 (1922).
See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 546.
Id.; see also Dingus, supra note 14, at 275.
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bidding.8 0 Community alleged that Draper and Crump engaged in conduct of
the latter type.
Evidence normally required to show suppressed bidding is an inadequate
sale price. 13' In Boatmen's, Crump purchased at the sale for $93,050. The
market value of the property had been estimated around $300,000 to $400,000
at the time of the sale.' Although there may be other reasons for the low sale
price, it has been suggested that in chilled bidding situations, "public policy,
even in the absence of clearly established injury, dictates a presumption in
favor of setting aside the sale as a deterrent to such intentional or collusive
behavior.""'
It has been said that bidding encourages others to bid."3 If this is true,
certainly Crump's statement had the effect of chilling the bids and contributing to the inadequate sale price. Eisenbeis, who testified that he could have
gotten financing through Harter's efforts, chose not to bid at the sale in reliance on Crump's statement. Had Eisenbeis bid more than $93,050 at the sale,
Crump would have had no choice but to bid a higher amount if he wanted to
purchase the property. Therefore, whether Eisenbeis chose not to bid at the
sale because of Crump's statement or whether he chose not to bid for another
reason was an important issue for the court to resolve.
The Boatmen's court made two assumptions in its analysis: "that a reasonable person would not believe . . . " and "that a reasonable person would
not rely. . ." on such a statement. Implicit in this analysis is the court's belief
that the mortgagor is to be held to the standard of a reasonable person. Yet,
Missouri courts have indicated that the irregularity which causes the chilled
bidding must create uncertainty in the minds of the bidders."35 This seems to
indicate a subjective uncertainty, not an objective reasonable person test. Certainly if the facts and circumstances surrounding a foreclosure sale are to be
analyzed in determining a sale's validity,"36 then holding the mortgagor to a
reasonable person standard results in an elimination of some of the facts necessary in the determination of what really happened.
Any statements or representations as to the property or state of the title, or
other circumstances which have a tendency to chill bidders or mislead or confuse them, or to discourage competition or depress the price of the property,
resulting in its sale for less than it would have brought at an auction fairly
conducted, will be cause for setting aside the sale."37

130. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 548; see also
Dingus, supra note 14, at 274.
131. See G.NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 548.
132. See infra notes 146-50 and accompanying text.
133. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 548.
134. See Vannoy v. Duvall Trust Co., 29 S.W.2d 692, 695 (Mo. 1930).
135. See S. TODD, supra note 19, § 4-10.
136. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
137. Stone v. Hammons, 347 Mo. 129, 132, 146 S.W.2d 606, 608 (1940) (quoting 42 .J.S. Mortgages § 1875 (1949)) (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol53/iss1/11

14

19881

Burch: Burch: Attempting to Set Aside

FORECLOSURE SALES

The Missouri Supreme Court was definitely not using an objective standard in Miles v. Popp. 138 The second mortgagee had informed a prospective
bidder several times before the foreclosure sale that he intended to make the
sale bring enough to cover both the first and second notes (a total of $1450
plus interest). 13 9 In holding that the trustee and second mortgagee had conspired to prevent competition, one of the items the court pointed out was that
the prospective bidder attended the sale but did not enter a bid. "He evidently
saw [the second mortgagee] standing there, and thought, 'It's no use.' ",140 The
court did not analyze whether the prospective bidder should have believed or
should have relied on the statement. It was inferred by his actions that he had
believed the statement and relied upon it.
Another issue arises concerning the Boatmen's court's use of the objective
standard. If the mortgagor is held to the reasonable person test, does that
eliminate all information regarding his sophistication in real estate matters?
And if so, does this mean the sophistication of the trustee and the other parties
involved in the foreclosure action is irrelevant? Surely the sophistication of
Draper and Crump should be considered. Draper was a trustee, owner of a
title company, owner of an investment company, and owner of a land company.141 Crump was a real estate broker who often invested in real estate
transactions.142 During the past ten-year period, Draper and Crump had been
partners in twenty-five real estate ventures. 4 3 Conversely, there was no evidence that Ron Eisenbeis had any experience or knowledge in real estate other
than being the owner of Community Interiors. There was no indication that he
was well-versed in the procedures of foreclosure sales or that he knew what
bids individual parties logically should make.
To follow the Boatmen's court's analysis to its logical conclusion, if it was
unreasonable for the mortgagor to believe or rely on such a statement, was it
not equally unreasonable for a prospective purchaser to make such a statement? And if sophistication in the field is to be considered, doesn't the statement become all the more unreasonable when one considers the extensive
background Crump had in real estate matters? If it was an unreasonable
statement, the relevant question then becomes what his purpose was in making
it. The court found that such a statement had been made although Crump
denied making it.'" It is interesting to note here that Crump, who bid only
138. 192 S.W. 424 (Mo. 1917).
139. Id. at 425.
140. Id. at 426; see also Sullivan v. Federal Farm Mortgage Corp., 62 Ga. App.
402, 8 S.E.2d 126 (1940) (conduct of mortgagee in circulating report that mortgagee
would buy mortgagor's property for at least the amount of the debt, then purchasing
for a much smaller amount than the debt, where mortgagor believed and relied and
therefore did not attend the sale, rendered sale invalid and fraudulent).
141. Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 75-76.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 76.
144. Although the court did not discuss Crump's denial in making the statement,
implicit in the court's reasoning is that it believed the statement had been made; for if
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$50.00 more than Boatmen's Bank, the next highest bidder, was a member
of
1 45
the board of directors for Boatmen's at the time of the foreclosure sale.
Community also alleged that the property was sold for "grossly inadequate consideration.1 146 A real estate appraiser at the trial testified that the
property was worth between $310,000 and $400,000 in 1979.147 Eisenbeis testified that the property was worth $300,000 at the time of the sale in September, 198 1. 48There was also testimony at trial that land values were beginning
to fall in the spring of 1980 and that interest rates were around twenty percent
at the time of the sale.14 9 Crump purchased the property for $93,050,150 which
represented a sales price of one-third to one-fourth of the property's reasonable value.
Missouri follows the doctrine that mere inadequacy of the sale price is not
enough to justify setting aside the sale, unless there has been fraud, unfairness,
or irregularity. 151 Reasons courts have given for not setting aside sales because
of mere inadequate consideration have been that selling property through a
forced sale at the courthouse steps does not produce the best sales price, and
setting aside the sale for inadequacy of
price would frustrate power of sale
1 52
foreclosures and render them worthless.

If the price is so gross and manifest as to "shock the conscience," it may
be evidence of fraud or imposition.15 3 "When the conscience is shocked, the
ear of the chancellor opens." 1 " However, Missouri courts will go to great
lengths to keep from overturning a sale even if the price seems grossly inadequate. 15 Sales have been upheld when the price has been as little as onetwentieth of the value of the property. 158
Inadequacy of sales price has had most of its impact when there have
been circumstances involved in the sale which indicate mistake, unfair dealing,
no statement had been made to Ron, no chilled bidding could have occurred. Instead,
the court's analysis centered around Ron's unreasonableness in believing and relying on
the statement. Id. at 78.
145.

Id. at 75.

146. Id. at 76.
147. Id. at 77.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 540; S. TODD,
supra note 19, § 4-13; Dingus, supra note 14, at 262-64; Recent Decisions, Bargains at
Sales Under Power in Deeds of Trust, 8 UMKC L. REv. 255 (1940); Annotation, Sale
Under Power in Mortgage or Trust Deed as Affected by Inadequacy of Price, 8 A.L.R.

1001 (1920).
152. See S. TODD, supra note 19, § 4-13.
153. See Dingus, supra note 14, at 262-64.
154. Hanson v. Neal, 215 Mo. 256, 275, 114 S.W. 1073, 1079 (1908).
155. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 540; Dingus,
supra note 14, at 263.
156. See Dingus, supra note 14, at 264.
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or fraud.157 Inadequacy of price is the most important factor in those cases
where sales have been set aside. This is because without an inadequate price,
there has been no prejudice and therefore no need to set aside the sale. 5 ' Few
sales have been attacked unless there has been an allegation of inadequate
consideration. 59
The Boatmen's court gave two reasons why the sales price did not warrant setting aside the sale. First, since the court had previously ruled that
there had not been any violations of the trustee's fiduciary duties at the sale,
an inadequate price alone did not warrant setting aside the sale. 6 0 Second, the
selling price was not so "grossly inadequate" as to justify the court's overturn6
ing the sale on that fact alone.' '
If the decision as to whether or not a foreclosure sale should be overturned depends on the facts and circumstances of the case, 62 it is important
for the court to analyze the situation carefully. After all, the trustee's fiduciary role' 613 requires a standard of him that should not be taken lightly.
The safeguards built into the power of sale foreclosure system have been
established to protect the parties from unfair conduct at the sale. 6 However,
a mortgagor could find himself in the position of knowing something was
wrong with the sale but not being able to produce the kind of evidence that the
Boatmen's court seems to be requiring. The trustee is in the position of knowing how the particular mortgagor's foreclosure sale was conducted. The mortgagor whose property was taken, however, has to try to obtain that information from the very person he is trying to use it against. This handicap is
especially relevant in Boatmen's because the trustee was involved in so many
aspects of the sale.
Draper was the trustee for the first mortgagee; he bid at the sale for the
second mortgagee; he provided the financing for his long-time business associate's purchase; he obtained a one-half interest in the foreclosed property four
days after the sale; he and the purchaser had engaged in similar real estate
transactions approximately twenty-five times before; his business associate had
made a statement to the mortgagor on the day of the sale that arguably may
have convinced the mortgagor not to bid; the property was sold to his business
associate for one-third to one-fourth of its reasonable value; his business associate who purchased at the sale was currently on the board of directors for the
second mortgagee. Yet the court held that no fiduciary duties had been
breached.
157. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 540; Dingus,
supra note 14, at 265-66.
158. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 11, § 7.21, at 540.
159. See Annotation, supra note 151, at 1007.
160. Boatmen's, 721 S.W.2d at 78.
161. Id.
162. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 22-38 and accompanying text.
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Not being privy to much of the information needed to prove the trustee's
breach may force the mortgagor to prove his case by means of implication as
Community resorted to doing."'B If the court disregards this type of argument,
the end result will be that the more knowledgeable trustee will be able to
engage in unfair conduct that the mortgagor will have difficulty proving.
When one considers the price a mortgagor pays by not being able to set aside
the sale even though it may have been conducted unfairly, the courts of equity
begin not to seem so equitable.
KAREN

A.

BURCH

165. See supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text.
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